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Does founders’ human capital matter for innovation?
 












Using a sample from an original questionnaire survey in Japan, this paper explores 
whether and how founders’ human capital affects innovation outcomes by start-ups. 
The results provide evidence that founders with greater human capital are more likely 
to yield innovation outcome. However, because certain types of founders’ human 
capital may boost R&D investment, which possibly results in innovation outcomes, 
we estimate the determinants of innovation outcomes by an instrumental variable 
probit model taking into account the endogeneity of R&D investment. Our findings 
suggest that specific human capital for innovation, such as founders’ prior innovation 
experience, is directly associated with innovation outcomes after start-up, while generic 
human capital, such as founders’ educational background, indirectly affects innovation 
outcomes through R&D investment. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely recognized that the emergence of start-ups and their post-entry performance 
significantly contribute to economic growth and that small businesses plays significant roles in a 
large fraction of innovations (e.g., Acs and Audretsch, 1990). More recently, start-ups have been 
paid attention as the sources of innovation and productivity in regions (e.g., Audretsch et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, it has often been argued that, as is known as the so-called “Schumpeterian 
hypothesis,” large firms have more advantages in innovations than small firms.1  In fact, it may be 
quite difficult for start-ups to be successful in innovations because of their limited resources and 
experience. Whereas scholars and policy makers pay attention to what types of start-ups 
contribute to innovation, there has been quite limited evidence on whether and how start-ups can 
be successful in innovation. 
Meanwhile, it has often been argued that founders’ human capital play a critical role in 
determining firm performance (e.g., Cressy, 1996). Because knowledge and skills that are key 
components of human capital are required to generate innovations, human capital is an inevitable 
resource for research and development (R&D). Especially for R&D-oriented start-ups that 
undertake R&D activities at the start-up stage, founders’ human capital may relate more 
significantly to the post-entry performance of their firms. To date, nevertheless, little is known 
about whether and how founders’ human capital affects the firms’ innovations. In this respect, it is 
worth to highlight the role of founders’ human capital in determining innovation outcomes of 
start-ups. 
                                                 
1  For more discussion on the relationship between innovation and firms size, see, for example, Cohen et al. (1987), and 
Acs and Audretsch (1990).   3
This paper explores whether and how founders’ human capital affects innovations among 
start-ups in Japan. It is a widely held view that innovation activities differ considerably across firms, 
and founders’ human capital may help to explain these differences. In this paper, using a sample 
from an original questionnaire survey in Japan, we examine whether founders’ human capital 
affects innovations. The results provide evidence on the determinants of innovations in start-ups, 
and, in particular, we shed light on the role of founders’ human capital in determining innovation 
outcomes. To better understand how start-ups achieve innovation outcomes, we identify what 
types of founders’ human capital affect innovation outcomes in start-ups. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we review the 
background and related literature to this paper. Section 3 presents some testable hypotheses. 
Section 4 describes the data and variables used in the analysis. The empirical methods and results 
are presented in Section 5. The final section includes some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Background and related literature 
Despite increasing public interest in innovation created by high-tech start-ups, many start-ups 
encounter difficulties in conducting R&D. This is mainly because start-ups are likely to lack capital 
for R&D. Not surprisingly, the access to external financial markets tends to be limited when 
founders start their businesses. Even if a start-up has high growth potential, external financial 
markets do not always provide funds because of market imperfections due to information 
asymmetries between the founder and the providers of external finance; that is, founders are likely 
to face financial constraints. In fact, a large number of studies have addressed the effects of 
financial constraints on the level of capital used at start-up (e.g., Evans and Jovanovic, 1989;   4
Åstebro and Bernhardt, 2005). Perhaps, the information asymmetries are more severe for 
R&D-oriented start-ups because it is quite difficult to gauge the success of R&D at the start-up 
stage. Therefore, these start-ups cannot easily obtain funds for R&D investment, even though they 
require a large amount of capital for R&D. 
Whereas it is considered that the innovation outcomes of R&D-oriented start-ups depend 
on the amount of capital for R&D, it has often been argued that the success of start-ups is 
dependent on their founders’ human capital. Bates (1990), for example, argued that the 
entrepreneurs’ human capital inputs affect small business longevity, and Cressy (1996) emphasized 
that human capital is the true determinant of firm survival. In addition, some empirical studies 
have provided evidence on the relationship between firm growth and the human capital of 
founders or entrepreneurs (e.g., Honjo, 2004; Colombo and Grilli, 2005). These studies have 
indicated that founders’ human capital is a valuable resource for start-ups and plays a critical role 
in the firm’s performance, partly because it can compensate for the lack of business experience 
and resources. 
More specifically, Bates (1990) found that human capital measured by the years of education 
is strongly linked to business viability. Åstebro and Bernhardt (2005) also argued that increased 
human capital provides founders with greater ability to create and manage viable enterprises. In 
addition, Colombo and Grilli (2005) indicated that individuals with greater human capital are likely 
to have better entrepreneurial judgment, and that firms established by founders with greater 
human capital outperform other firms because of their unique capabilities. They emphasize the 
“capability effect” of founders’ human capital, which explains the positive effect of human capital 
on the performance. Colombo and Grilli (2005) then found that the nature of the education and   5
of the prior work experience of founders exerts a key influence on the growth. Colombo et al. 
(2004) also showed that founders’ human capital, such as educational background and work 
experience, have a crucial influence on the start-up size of new technology-based firms (NTBFs).2 
These findings indicate that founders’ human capital serves as a valuable resource to achieve 
better firm performance. 
To date, however, few studies have addressed the role of founders’ human capital in 
determining firms’ innovations at the start-up stage. A related paper is Marvel and Lumpkin 
(2007), which studied the effects of technology entrepreneurs’ human capital on innovation 
radicalness using a sample of 145 technology entrepreneurs operating within university-affiliated 
incubators. They found that entrepreneurs’ human capital, such as educational background and 
prior technology knowledge, positively affects innovation radicalness. However, it is unclear 
whether innovation radicalness represents innovation outcomes, because it may depend on 
subjective evaluation by entrepreneurs. In this paper, we use multiple measures of innovation 
outcomes (product/process innovations and patent applications). Moreover, most previous studies, 
including Marvel and Lumpkin (2007), focus on the effects of human capital on innovation 
output, but not on innovation input. In this paper, we will fill these gaps by examining the effects 
of founders’ human capital on both R&D investment (innovation input) and innovation outcomes, 




                                                 
2  More recently, Coleman (2007) also showed that human capital, such as education and experience, plays an important 
role in the profitability and growth of small firms.   6
3. Hypotheses 
In this section, we present some testable hypotheses for the role of founders’ human capital in 
determining innovation outcomes in start-ups. As discussed in the previous section, it is 
considered that founders’ human capital plays a more important role in R&D activities of 
start-ups, than in those of large and established firms, because of limited resources at the start-up 
stage. For R&D-oriented start-ups, founders’ human capital is an essential factor in the innovative 
process, and it will compensate for deficiencies in physical capital at the start-up stage. As 
Colombo and Grilli (2005) argued, founders’ human capital may reflect firms’ capabilities for 
R&D. In addition, founders with greater human capital have better access to research network 
with external organizations (e.g., Okamuro et al., 2011). For these reasons, we consider that 
H1: Founders with greater human capital are more likely to generate innovation outcomes in start-ups. 
Previous literature often distinguishes between generic and specific human capital. According to 
Colombo et al. (2004), generic human capital relates to the general knowledge acquired by 
entrepreneurs (founders) through both formal education and professional experience, while 
specific human capital consists of the capabilities of individuals that can directly be applied to the 
entrepreneurial job in the newly created firms. Colombo et al. (2004) found that variables that 
reflect specific components of human capital, such as work experience in the same sector as the 
new firm as well as managerial and entrepreneurial experience exhibit greater explanatory power 
than those that reflect generic components, such as work experience in other sectors. Åstebro and 
Bernhardt (2003) also examined the effects of human capital on firm performance, by 
distinguishing between formal and informal human capital that reflects general and specific   7
human capital. These studies suggest that the effects of founder’s human capital depend heavily 
on its types. 
In fact, some types of founders’ human capital affect organizational performance; for 
example, prior work experience is likely to lead to efficient production within the organization. 
However, it is doubtful whether this type of human capital directly relates to innovation outcomes. 
More specifically, managerial experience may be indispensable for management, but it is unclear if 
this type of human capital is significantly associated with innovation outcomes. Because 
technological knowledge and skills differ significantly from managerial ones, technological 
knowledge and skills possessed by founders would rather play a critical role in generating 
innovation outcomes. In this respect, we should distinguish between the types of founders’ human 
capital. More precisely, innovation outcomes depend heavily on specific human capital for R&D 
activities, such as prior experience of product/process innovations. Hence, we can say that 
H2: Specific human capital for R&D activities is positively and more strongly associated with innovation outcomes 
in start-ups than generic human capital. 
Founders with greater human capital are capable of gaining better access to external 
finance under the financial market imperfections. As Åstebro and Bernhardt (2005) pointed out, 
such founders can relax financial constraints that otherwise hinder firm performance. Whereas 
start-ups cannot easily access external finance for R&D, some types of founders’ human capital 
play a role in creating opportunities to access it. More specifically, work experience may be useful 
to negotiate with banks and investors. In addition, some types of founders’ human capital, such as 
academic experience, may serve as a signal of creditworthiness to the providers of external   8
finance under information asymmetries between founders and these providers. In accordance with 
these arguments, it is hypothesized that founders’ human capital does not only directly relate to 
innovation outcomes, but also facilitates access to financial capital for R&D. Hence, we 
hypothesize that 
H3: Generic human capital is more likely to boost R&D investment rather than innovation outcomes in start-ups. 
Parker and van Praag (2006) emphasize the possibility that human capital has an indirect effect 
on performance by facilitating access to financial capital, thus diluting any financial constraint. 
Following them, we argue that founders’ human capital has not only a direct, but also an indirect 
effect on innovation outcomes. Both roles of founders’ human capital are expected to be 
particularly important at the start-up stage because of severe information asymmetries. 
 
4. Data 
4. 1. Data sources 
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no publicly available data source for R&D activities by 
start-ups in Japan. In order to construct a data set of start-ups for our research project, we 
conducted a postal questionnaire survey in November 2008. We sent questionnaires to 13,582 
firms in the Japanese manufacturing and software industries, which had been incorporated 
between January 2007 and August 2008. The list of firms for the survey was obtained from a 
database compiled by Tokyo Shoko Research (TSR), a major credit investigation company in 
Japan. In the questionnaire survey, we asked the founders about firm-specific characteristics, 
including R&D activities, as well as their personal attributes.     9
The number of effective responses was 1514 (approximately 11% of the target). With regard 
to industry structure and location, the respondents were not considerably different from the target 
firms as a whole, though software firms are more strongly represented among the respondents 
than manufacturing start-ups. From among the responses, we selected 1060 “real” start-ups that 
had started their businesses during 2007 and 20083. Moreover, we excluded from the dataset the 
firms that did not invest in R&D at start up and afterwards and that provide no information on 
R&D investment (together approximately 250 firms). We further excluded 40 subsidiaries and 
affiliated firms of existing firms, because they have quite different characteristics from 
independent start-ups at the founder and firm levels, especially with regard to the amount and 
structure of initial funds. After excluding some observations due to missing values, we obtained a 
final sample of 204 firms. 
In addition, we use another data source to collect data on industry-specific characteristics. 
Industry’s R&D intensity is measured by the industry’s R&D expenditures divided by its sales, 
which were taken from the Results of Basic Survey of Japanese Business Structure and Activities by the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). Data on the appropriability of innovation 
outcomes and technological opportunities were taken and calculated from the Report on the 
Japanese National Innovation Survey 2003, compiled by the National Institute of Science and 
Technology Policy (NISTEP) of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology (MEXT). 
 
                                                 
3  Other firms were founded before 2006 and incorporated in 2007 or 2008.     10
4. 2. Innovation outcomes 
The effects of founders’ human capital may differ according to the types of innovation outcome, 
but it is quite difficult to determine appropriate measures of innovation outcomes. Perhaps, profits 
or market values are ultimate objectives of R&D for private firms, but these values are not an 
appropriate index at the start-up stage because of the time lag existing between innovation and 
profits. 
Instead, in this paper, we attempt to capture innovation outcomes by asking the founders 
whether or not their start-ups achieved product or process innovations in our questionnaire survey. 
Based on the survey, the variable for product or process innovations (INN) is used as a dependent 
variable in our empirical model. 
Also, intellectual property right---that is, patent---has often been used to measure innovation 
outcomes in previous literature (e.g., Hausman et al., 1984). Although patent applications may not 
completely reflect the quality of innovation outcomes, they will be able to reveal the degree of the 
firm’s innovative activities. In our questionnaire survey, we inquired about patent applications. 
Using this data, we defined the variable, PAT, which indicates whether or not the firm applied for 
patents after the foundation, as innovation outcomes. Using these variables, we attempt to 
understand factors affecting differences in innovation outcomes among R&D-oriented start-ups. 
 
4. 3. Determinants of innovation outcomes 
Founders’ human capital is measured by founder-specific characteristics, which can be retrieved 
from the data source. In this paper, we define two types of variables: generic and specific human   11
capital for R&D. Colombo and Grilli (2004) argued that generic human capital is related to the 
general knowledge acquired by entrepreneurs through both formal education and professional 
experience. In fact, a number of studies have used educational attainments as a measure of 
founders’ human capital (e.g., Bates, 1990; Åstebro and Bernhardt, 2005). Following these studies, 
we measure the educational background of founders by dummy variables, UEDU and GEDU, 
which correspond to undergraduate university education and graduate school education levels, 
respectively.  
Also, the variables for prior work experience in the related field at start-up (WEXP) and prior 
managerial experience in other firms prior to start-up (MEXP) are used as independent variables 
representing  generic human capital in our model. Contrary to Colombo and Grilli (2005) that 
considered them to be specific human capital for business performance, we regard them as generic 
human capital for innovative performance, because these experiences are not necessarily and 
exclusively associated with innovative activities.   
As for specific human capital, we measure founders’ prior innovation experience to capture 
founders’ human capital more specified to innovative activities.  A dummy variable, INNEXP, is 
used to measure founders’ experience of product/process innovations prior to start-up, in the 
model with product/process innovations as the dependent variable (INN). Also, a dummy variable 
for founders’ prior experience regarding patent applications is alternatively used as independent 
variables representing technological capabilities of founders in the model with patent applications 
(PAT) as another dependent variable. These may indicate the degree of founder’s technological 
capabilities. Moreover, a dummy variable, ACAD, is used to measure the founder’s affiliation to 
academic associations in the natural sciences. This may indicate the extent of founder’s professional   12
network as well as technological capabilities. Finally, we include the variable for the founder’s age, 
AGE, in order to control for differences in age and generation among founders. 
With respect to independent variables other than those variables for founders’ human capital, 
the variables for firm-specific and industry-specific characteristics are used in the analysis. First, the 
firm’s intensity of R&D investment, RDEXP, which represents R&D inputs, is defined as R&D 
expenditures divided by the number of employees. The variable, SIZE, measured as the number of 
employees, is also used to control for differences in firm size at the start-up stage. Since some firms 
were established by multiple founders, a dummy variable for multiple founders, MFOUND, is used 
as a control variable. Furthermore, we use the industry’s R&D intensity (INDRD), appropriability 
of technological outcomes (APPROP) and technological opportunities (TECHOPP), to control for 
differences in the technological characteristics across industries4. 
 
5. Empirical methods and results 
5. 1. Methods 
Based on the sample of R&D-oriented start-ups, we examine the effects of founders’ human capital 
on the firms’ innovation outcomes at the start-up stage. As discussed, innovation outcomes depend 
on R&D investment because financial constraints hinder R&D activities. Moreover, as 
hypothesized in H1 and H2, innovation outcomes may depend on founder’s human capital as well. 
In this paper, we thus write a model explaining innovation outcomes, which is defined as the 
function of both R&D investment and founders’ human capital. Assuming for simplicity that the 
relationships are linear, we estimate the effects of R&D investment and founders’ human capital on 
                                                 
4  See Okamuro (2009) for details for the construction of these variables.   13
innovation outcomes of R&D-oriented start-ups. Since, as already mentioned, the variables for 
innovation outcomes are measured as binary variables, we employ a probit model to estimate the 
model for the determinants of innovation outcomes. 
As described in H3, we consider that generic human capital affects R&D investment, rather 
than innovation outcomes for R&D-oriented start-ups. In this respect, R&D investment may be 
regarded as a function of founders’ human capital. Taking into account the endogeneity of R&D 
investment, therefore, we employ a probit model with an endogenous regressor to estimate the 
model for the determinants of innovation outcomes. Assuming that R&D investment is 
endogenously determined, we examine whether innovation outcomes are significantly associated 
with R&D investment. By doing so, we can identify which type of founders’ human capital affects 
innovation outcomes, R&D investment or both of them. In the analysis, we first estimate the 
model for the determinants of R&D investment, using instrumental variables for R&D investment, 
and then examine the determinants of innovation outcomes. 
We employ the probit model with an endogenous regressor, in order to estimate the 
determinants of innovation outcomes. In this paper, we use two variables, REQRD and IF, as the 
instruments that control for differences in the demand and supply for R&D investment across 
firms. In the questionnaire, we asked how much firms require R&D investment for one year, in 
order to obtain sufficient innovation output. Using this value, we capture the demand for R&D 
investment, which indicates investment opportunities for R&D. Moreover, we consider that the 
demand for R&D investment is not directly associated with innovation outcomes because of 
technological and market uncertainties. Hence, the variable for the demand for R&D investment 
(REQRD) is included as an instrument in the first-stage regression.     14
In the traditional investment model, cash-flow has often been used to capture the availability 
of internal finance that hypothetically mitigates financial constraints. However, cash-flow is not 
appropriate as a proxy for the availability of internal finance at start-up, because most start-up firms 
cannot establish sufficient cash-flow at the initial stage. Alternatively, we pay attention to the 
sources of initial funds at start-up, because start-up firms use their initial funds for operation and 
investment at the early stage. In the questionnaire, we asked for the amount of initial funds 
obtained from each type of funding sources at start-up including founders themselves and their 
family and friends. We regard the initial funds provided by the founders themselves and their family 
and friends as internal finance and use them as a proxy for internal finance (IF). We argue that 
internal finance measured as this type of initial funds is strongly associated with R&D investment, 
but is not directly associated with innovation outcomes because of uncertainties of R&D, and thus 
include this variable as an instrument in the first-stage regression. 
Table 1 summarizes the definitions of the variables used in the analysis. 
 
5. 2. Results and discussion 
Table 2 describes the summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in the 
analysis. As shown in Table 2, about 44% and 17 % of R&D-oriented start-ups have achieved 
product/process innovations and applied for patent applications after their start-up, respectively.   
With respect to founders’ human capital, as shown in Table 2, 52% of the founders had 
achieved a bachelor’s degree and 13% a master’s or doctorate degree. Table 2 also shows that, 
before start-up, 85% of the founders worked in a related field and 35% as managers of other firms. 
Moreover, founders had prior experience of product/process innovations and patent applications,   15
before start-up, in 36% and 22% of firms, respectively. As shown in Table 2, 18% of the founders 
in our sample are affiliated to academic associations in the natural sciences. The founders were on 
average 46 years old at start-up, with the minimum and the maximum being 20 and 80 years old, 
respectively. Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of these variables. 
We show the estimation results in Table 4. The variables, INN and PAT, are the dependent 
variables of the regressions. While Columns (i) and (ii) of Table 4 describes the estimation results 
with INN and PAT, respectively. The numbers of observations are 179 and 174 in Columns (i) and 
(ii), respectively. In addition, we estimate the determinants of innovation outcomes, using the 
probit model with an endogenous regressor, in which R&D investment is regarded as endogenously 
determined. Table 5 describes the estimation results. Columns (i) and (ii) of Table 5 describe the 
results with INN and PAT, respectively. While the first stage regression indicates the estimation 
results for the determinants of R&D investment, the second stage indicates those for the 
determinants of innovation outcomes in Table 5. 
As shown in Table 4, we find that the coefficients of RDEXP are positive and strongly 
significant, indicating that innovation outcomes are positively associated with R&D investment. 
This result indicates that firms investing more heavily in R&D among R&D-oriented start-ups are 
likely to obtain innovation outcomes. In addition to R&D investment, we find that certain types 
of founders’ human capital have positive effects on innovation outcomes.5 The coefficients of 
GEDU are positive and significant in both the models of Table 4, suggesting that founders with 
higher educational attainments are more likely to obtain innovation outcomes. Also, the 
                                                 
5  We also employed ordinary least squares method and a negative binomial model, using data on the number of patent 
applications as a dependent variable and obtained similar relationships between innovation outcomes and founders’ 
human capital.   16
coefficients of INNEXP and PATEXP are positive and significant in Columns (i) and (ii) of 
Table 4, respectively. These results indicate that founders’ prior experience of product/process 
innovations and patent applications relates to innovation outcomes. Overall, these types of 
founders’ human capital may reflect the firm’s technological capabilities, and our findings indicate 
that founders’ human capital is positively associated with innovation outcome for R&D-oriented 
start-ups. It can be concluded that founders’ human capital plays a critical role in achieving 
innovations at the start-up stage. 
Also, as shown in Table 4, founders’ age positively affects innovation outcomes. This result 
suggests that older founders are more likely to obtain innovation outcomes, although this variable 
was simply included as a control variable in the regression. On the other hand, other 
founder-specific characteristics, such as work and managerial experiences, WEXP and MEXP, 
and the affiliation to academic associations, ACAD, are not significant in any models of Table 4. 
Also, Table 4 indicates that some firm-specific characteristics, SIZE, IND, and MFOUND, have 
no significant effect on innovation outcomes. Moreover, in Column (ii) of Table 4 indicates that 
the industry’s appropriability of innovation outcomes, APPROP, has a significantly positive effect 
on innovation outcomes, while the industry’s R&D intensity and technological opportunities has 
no significant effect. These results suggest that industry conditions matter for innovative activities.   
Meanwhile, as shown in Table 5, some types of founders’ human capital affect R&D 
investment. More specifically, the coefficient of GEDU is positive at the 1% significance level in 
the first stage regression, while no significant relationship between innovation outcomes and 
founders’ educational background is found in the second stage. This result suggests that highly 
educated founders invest more in R&D, but are not more likely to achieve innovation outcomes.   17
Thus, such human capital has rather an indirect effect on innovation outcomes of R&D-oriented 
start-ups. In the second stage of Table 5, moreover, the coefficient of RDEXP is positive and 
significant, and INNEXP and PATEXP have strongly significant effects on innovation outcomes. 
This is consistent with the results of Table 4. 
To sum up, these empirical results partially support all of our hypotheses: H1 and H2 are 
supported with regard to the founders’ innovation experience prior to start-up (INNEXP and 
PATEXP), measures of specific human capital, while H3 is supported with regard to the founders’ 
educational attainment at the graduate school level (GEDU), a measure of generic human capital. It 
is also noteworthy that not all types of founders’ human capital contribute to achieving innovation 
outcomes, directly or indirectly.   
A number of studies have pointed out the significant and direct effects of founders’ human 
capital on firm performance until now (e.g., Colombo and Grilli, 2005). However, we argue that 
indirect effects of founders’ human capital are also important to innovation outcomes. Indeed, as 
our estimation results demonstrate, founders’ educational level affects R&D investment rather 
than innovation outcomes. Hence, we suggest that, in order to better understand the effects of 





                                                 
6  In this paper, we considered the effects of founders’ human capital on innovation outcomes through R&D investment. 
Needless to say, there remains the possibility that founders’ human capital has an impact on innovation outcomes 
through another factor, such as R&D cooperation. In this respect, further investigation may be required to deepen our 
understanding of the complex relationships between founders’ human capital and innovation outcomes of start-ups.   18
6. Conclusions 
This paper explored the determinants of innovation outcomes of R&D-oriented start-ups. Using a 
sample from an original questionnaire survey in Japan, we examined whether and how founders’ 
human capital affects innovation outcomes at the start-up stage. We provided evidence that certain 
types of founders’ human capital, namely their innovation performance prior to start-up, are 
directly associated with innovation outcomes. Our findings also suggested that founders’ higher 
(graduate school) education is associated with R&D investment, indicating that part of founders’ 
human capital has an indirect effect on innovation outcomes through R&D investment. 
While, as is often argued, Japan has achieved technological catch-up and is now striving for 
technological leadership in the manufacturing sector, this country is characterized by almost the 
lowest ratio of business start-ups among OECD countries. In this respect, policy makers are 
concerned about the lack of entrepreneurship. High-tech start-ups are expected to stimulate future 
economic growth, but indeed it is not easy for these firms to achieve successful innovation. In this 
regard, as this paper suggested, founders’ human capital may enhance the probability of success in 
innovations---not only specific human capital but also generic human capital of founders has an 
impact, though indirectly, on innovation outcomes. Our findings imply that founders’ human 
capital is indispensable to propel innovation introduced by high-tech start-ups. For future economy, 
we should pay more attention to the development of entrepreneurial human capital in support of 
national innovation systems in the countries with low start-up ratios, such as Japan.   
   19
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INN  Dummy variable: 1 if the firm has product/process innovations after start-up. 
PAT  Dummy variable: 1 if the firm has conducted patent applications after start-up. 
(Independent variable) 
Founder-specific characteristics 
UEDU  Dummy variable: 1 if the founder has undergraduate education, 0 otherwise. 
GEDU  Dummy variable: 1 if the founder has graduate school education, 0 otherwise. 
WEXP  Dummy variable: 1 if the founder has prior work experience in the related field at 
start-up, 0 otherwise. 
MEXP  Dummy variable: 1 if the founder has prior managerial experience in other firms at 
start-up, 0 otherwise. 
INNEXP  Dummy variable: 1 if the founder has prior experience of product/process 
innovations at start-up, 0 otherwise. 
PATEXP  Dummy variable: 1 if the founder has prior experience of patent applications at 
start-up, 0 otherwise. 
ACAD  Dummy variable: 1 if the founder is a member of academic association in the 
natural sciences, 0 otherwise. 
AGE  Founder’s age at start-up. 
Firm-specific characteristics 
RDEXP  R&D expenditures (million yen) divided by the number of employees. 
SIZE  Number of employees at start-up. 
SUB  Dummy variable: 1 if the firm is founded a subsidiary or an affiliated firm, 0 
otherwise. 
MFOUND  Dummy variable: 1 if the firm has multiple founders, 0 otherwise. 
Industry-specific characteristics 
INDRD  R&D expenditures divided by sales. 
APPROP  Degree of appropriability of innovation outcomes. 
TECHOPP  Degree of technological opportunities. 
Others: Instruments 
REQRD  Required R&D investment (million yen) 
IF  Amount of internal funding, measured as founder’s own funding plus his or her 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of variables 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  S.D.  Min.  Max. 
(Dependent variable) 
INN  179 0.436 0.497  0 1 
PAT  174 0.172 0.379  0 1 
(Independent variable) 
Founder-specific characteristics 
UEDU  179 0.520 0.501  0 1 
GEDU  179 0.134 0.342  0 1 
WEXP  179 0.849 0.359  0 1 
MEXP  179 0.352 0.479  0 1 
INNEXP  179 0.363 0.482  0 1 
PATEXP  174 0.218 0.414  0 1 
ACAD  179 0.179 0.384  0 1 
AGE  179 46.330 11.357  22 80 
Firm-specific characteristics 
RDEXP  179 5.297  10.389 0.050  80 
SIZE  179 3.838 5.471  1 53 
MFOUND  179 0.480 0.501  0 1 
Industry-specific characteristics 
RDINT  179 1.489 0.601 0.364 2.656 
APPROP  179 1.209 0.224 0.869 1.834 
TECHOPP  179 0.897 0.171 0.559 1.071 
Instruments 
REQRD  179 13.059 22.714  0.100  100 
IF  179 6.764  10.314  0 70 
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Table 3: Correlation matrix of variables (Number of obs.: 169) 
 
Variable  INN  PAT  UEDU  GEDU  WEXP MEXP INNEXP PATEXP ACAD AGE  RDEXP SIZE  MFOUND RDINT APPROP TECHOPP REQRD  IF 
INN 1.000 
PAT 0.295  1.000 
UEDU 0.060  -0.061  1.000   
GEDU  0.072  0.263  -0.399   1.000  
WEXP  0.062  -0.100  -0.022   0.157   1.000 
MEXP  0.034  0.025  0.029   -0.095   -0.099  1.000 
INNEXP  0.465  0.297  0.078   0.091   0.009  0.029  1.000 
PATEXP 0.184  0.386  -0.044    0.201   -0.092  -0.052  0.508  1.000 
ACAD  0.133  0.187  0.065   0.290   0.050 0.002  0.200  0.281 1.000 
AGE  0.019  0.153  -0.027   0.096   0.008 0.157  0.193  0.303 0.236  1.000   
RDEXP  0.270  0.252  -0.094   0.323   -0.007  0.042 0.040 0.077  0.118  -0.038    1.000 
SIZE  0.078  -0.029  -0.020   -0.064   -0.075 0.145  0.097  0.002 0.004  0.132   0.189 1.000 
MFOUND  0.109  -0.003  -0.005   -0.024   -0.148  0.121  0.021 -0.074  -0.002  -0.013    0.177  0.216  1.000 
RDINT  0.108  0.123  -0.141   0.098   0.153  -0.051  0.037 0.173  0.230  0.220    0.179  -0.009  0.192  1.000 
APPROP  0.068  0.179  0.030   -0.055   -0.051  0.110  0.115  0.004 0.014  0.075    -0.047  -0.029 0.106  0.009  1.000 
TECHOPP  -0.034  -0.059  0.026   0.017   0.155  -0.065  -0.088  -0.178 -0.053  -0.266   -0.046 -0.009 0.147  0.073  0.114 1.000 
REQRD  0.366  0.270  0.010   0.113   -0.057  0.116 0.004 0.050  0.012  -0.091    0.695  0.141 0.276  0.197  0.016 0.033  1.000   
IF  0.064  -0.044  -0.004   0.123   0.082  0.036 -0.031  0.030  0.196  0.069    0.299  0.349  0.056  0.064  -0.046  -0.033  0.163   1.000  
 
 
Note: This table shows the correlations between all the variables used in the instrumental variable probit regressions. Thus, the number of observations is different from those of 
the empirical regressions. 
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Table 4. Estimation results: Probit model 
 
 (i)  INN  (ii) PAT 
Variable Coef.  S.E.  Coef.  S.E. 
Founder-specific characteristics 
UEDU  0.284 0.225  0.212  0.300 
GEDU  0.028 0.352  0.694* 0.411 
WEXP  0.175 0.301  -0.523  0.331 
MEXP  0.078 0.222  -0.086  0.283 
INNEXP  1.467*** 0.224  
PATEXP  0.982*** 0.271 
ACAD  -0.111 0.308  0.223  0.315 
AGE  -0.013 0.010  0.021* 0.012 
Firm-specific characteristics 
RDEXP  0.050*** 0.017 0.032** 0.013 
SIZE  0.005 0.025  -0.042  0.038 
MFOUND  0.059 0.216  -0.207  0.283 
Industry-specific characteristics 
RDINT  0.291 0.186  -0.101  0.207 
APPROP  -0.125 0.461  1.276** 0.542 
TECHOPP  -0.215 0.676  0.314  0.805 
Constant term  -0.817  0.935  -3.723*** 1.126 
Pseudo R2 0.263  0.258 
N of obs.  204    199   
Log likelihood  -102.631    -68.716 
 
Note: 
1.  S.E. indicates robust standard errors. 
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Table 5. Estimation results: Probit model with an endogenous regressor 
   
(Second stage)  (i) INN (ii) PAT 
Variable  Coef. S.E.  Coef. S.E. 
Endogenous variable     
RDEXP  0.098*** 0.020 0.058*** 0.019 
Founder-specific characteristics    
UEDU  0.021 0.233  0.130 0.326 
GEDU  -0.599 0.392  0.446 0.495 
WEXP  0.288 0.320  -0.553 0.367 
MEXP  0.070 0.225  0.009 0.301 
INNEXP  1.287*** 0.268  
PATEXP  1.042*** 0.301 
ACAD  0.069 0.309  0.087 0.348 
AGE  -0.005 0.011  0.021 0.014 
Firm-specific characteristics    
SIZE  -0.018 0.023  -0.045 0.037 
MFOUND  -0.014 0.220  -0.284 0.315 
Indsutry-specific characteristics    
RDINT  0.047 0.198  -0.237 0.231 
APPROP  0.410 0.475  1.590*** 0.598 
TECHOPP  0.135 0.697  0.211 0.878 
Constant term  -1.673* 0.971  -3.817*** 1.224 
(First stage)  RDEXP  RDEXP 
Founder-specific characteristics     
UEDU  0.341 1.099  0.024 1.103 
GEDU  6.569*** 1.734 7.145*** 1.776 
WEXP  -1.322 1.438  -0.407 1.488 
MEXP  -0.558 1.071  -0.426 1.082 
INNEXP  0.487 1.060   
PATEXP  -0.515 1.301 
ACAD  -0.432 1.432  0.547 1.483 
AGE  -0.048 0.049  -0.041 0.049 
Firm-specific characteristics    
SIZE  0.109 0.099  0.153 0.100 
MFOUND  -0.497 1.069  -0.217 1.083 
Industry-specific characteristics    
RDINT  0.711 0.905  0.645 0.918 
APPROP  -1.814 2.256  -1.006 2.252 
TECHOPP  -4.135 3.112  -4.705 3.156 
Instruments    
REQRD  0.295*** 0.024 0.286*** 0.024 
IF  0.175*** 0.050 0.125*** 0.057 
Constant  term  7.338 4.467  6.116 4.496 
N of obs.  179      174  
Log likelihood  -671.322    -624.424 
Wald test of exogeneity  7.33***  3.34* 
                     
Note: 
1.  S.E. indicates standard errors. 
2.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.     wp-1 
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